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This paper examines how induction legitimately varies according to the impact of dif-
ferent knowledge constituting philosophical assumptions. As a result of its prevalence in
qualitative management research, the paper focuses on grounded theory and uses this as
a vehicle to explore the key parameters of the philosophical diversity articulated in judge-
ments around neutrality, description and theorization. A reﬂexive framework of inductive
praxis is offered as a heuristic device for interrogating the choices evidently at play in
the variable constitution of inductive management research. We indicate how there are
multiple modes of engagement, each of which is legitimate within its own philosophical
commitments. This implies the need for amore tolerant pluralistic stance in the evaluation
of qualitative management research.
Introduction
Various forms of induction have long underpinned
naturalistic, interpretivemodes of engagement and
the deployment of various qualitative method-
ologies (see Cressey, 1950; Denzin, 1971; Lincoln
and Guba, 1985; Lindesmith, 1947; Van Maanen,
1979). As several management researchers have re-
cently observed (e.g. Gephart, 2004, p. 457; Sud-
daby, 2006, p. 635), this association sharply con-
trasts with Popper’s (1959) hypothetico-deductive
methodology, which tends to predominate inmany
Anglophone cultural milieux (see Bengtsson, Elg
and Lind, 1997; Denzin, 2010; Pratt, 2008). Here
an a priori researcher-derived predictive concep-
tual and theoretical structure is rigorously tested
through the operationalization, measurement and
statistical analysis of the causal relationships be-
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tween variables (see Donaldson, Qui and Luo,
2013; Edwards, 2010). For some critics (e.g. Guba
and Lincoln, 1994, p. 106), such deployment of
what Outhwaite (1975) has deﬁned as erklaren has
on epistemological grounds served to determinis-
tically exclude the focus of interpretive research
through its analysis of the external antecedent con-
ditions that are presumed to cause the behaviours
under investigation. In contrast, any interpretive
focus is necessarily inductive as it entails verstehen
(Outhwaite, 1975) through aiming to access actors’
meaningful inter-subjective worlds, in their every-
day ‘natural’ context, and render them ‘under-
standable from the standpoint of a theory that is
grounded in the behaviours, languages, deﬁnitions,
attitudes, and feelings of those studied’ (Denzin,
1971, p.166).
The possible dangers of deductive method-
ological parochialism discriminating against the
publication of inductive management research in
prestigious management journals have been reg-
ularly articulated (Amis and Silk, 2008; Johnson
et al., 2006; Pratt, 2008). Moreover qualitative re-
searchers are sometimes deemed to collude in their
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Table 1. Positions on inter-subjectivity and neutrality
Rejection of actors’ inter-subjectivity as a
focus of social science research
Acceptance of actors’ inter-subjectivity as a focus
of social science research
Epistemic acceptance of a
neutral observational
language
(1) Promulgation of methodological
monism, e.g. contemporary mainstream
positivism
(2) Rejection of methodological monism and the
promulgation of induction as a means of
neutrally accessing other actors’
inter-subjectivity, e.g. neo-positivism
Epistemic rejection of a
neutral observational
language
(4) Philosophically incoherent position as
rejection of a neutral observation
language recognizes the inevitable role
of inter-subjective processes in research
processes and the articulation of
research outcomes
(3) Rejection of methodological monism and the
reformulation of induction as inevitably
inﬂuenced by a range of inter-subjective
processes that affect both the researcher and
the researched, e.g. critical theory; critical
realism; American Pragmatism
own downfall by showing a perceived lack of in-
ductive rigour. These possibilities have encouraged
several criteriological commentaries (e.g. Bansal
and Corley, 2011; Bluhm et al., 2011; Gephart,
2004; Pratt, 2009; Suddaby, 2006; Tracy, 2010,
2012) aimed at promoting and disciplining quali-
tative management research. The result is the ar-
ticulation of benchmarks, or ‘boiler plates’ (Pratt,
2009), that specify the ‘critical attributes of good
qualitative research’ (Bansal and Corley, 2011,
p. 233). For example, Suddaby (2006) draws pri-
marily upon Glaser and Strauss (1967) to guide
induction by deﬁning what ‘grounded theory is
not’. In doing so he ignores alternative renditions
of grounded theory (GT) (see for example Burr,
1995; Charmaz, 2000, 2009; March, 2005; Welch
et al., 2013) that draw upon different philosoph-
ical agendas to that tacitly articulated by Glaser
and Strauss. In contrast, philosophical diversity
in qualitative research is overtly noted by both
Gephart (2004) and Bluhm et al. (2011). Neverthe-
less, they purposefully restrict their generic crite-
riological speciﬁcations for inductive processes to
what, for instance, Bluhm et al. (2011) call ‘posi-
tivist and interpretivist approaches’ which they see
follow the principles of GT (2011, p. 1868) and
purposefully exclude alternative philosophical tra-
ditions. We shall argue in this paper that despite
a tacit and sometimes explicit awareness of the
philosophical heterogeneity evidently articulated
by qualitative researchers and their laudable desire
to endorse methodological pluralism, these speci-
ﬁcations for qualitative research generally, and GT
in particular, seem to be derived primarily from
only one possible philosophical position. This par-
ticular position has been variously labelled ‘soft’
positivism (Madill, Jordan and Shirley, 2000, p. 4),
‘qualitative’ positivism (Prasad and Prasad, 2002,
p. 6) or ‘neo’ positivism (Alvesson and Sandberg,
2013, p. 149; Lincoln and Guba, 1985, p. 46). A
key characteristic of this position is that the no-
tion of interpretation is only considered in rela-
tion to the inter-subjectivities of those actors be-
ing researched and is not recursively applied by
researchers to themselves. From here on we shall
use the term ‘neo-positivism’ to refer to this philo-
sophical position.
Represented by cell 1 in Table 1, many posi-
tivists (e.g. Abel, 1958) emphasized the need to
exclude inter-subjectivity from scientiﬁc explana-
tions of behaviour because such inner causes were
deemed to be unobservable in a neutral manner
and approaches such as verstehen were dismissed
as unscientiﬁc because they lacked objectivity (see
Ross, 1991). For Laing (1967) this exclusion of hu-
man subjectivity also served to bolster the monis-
tic desire for one methodology (ostensibly derived
from physics) to be used in both the social and
natural sciences since it removed any ontological
differentiation between the natural and the social
domains.
Couched in an overt rejection of such method-
ological monism, the neo-positivist dispute with
mainstreampositivism is largely limited towhether
inter-subjectivity is open to neutral observation by
researchers and the consequent appropriateness of
verstehen and induction to social science research
(see Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000; Markus, 1994)
(see cell 2 in Table 1). Hence a shared concern
of recent criteriological commentaries has been to
encourage qualitative management researchers to
systematically demonstrate rigour and objectivity
in their pursuit of isomorphic representations of
actors’ inter-subjectivities as a basis for inductive
theorizing usually in the form of GT (e.g. Bluhm
et al., 2011; Gephart, 2004; Pratt, 2009; Suddaby,
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2006). Alternative epistemological stances that re-
ject the possibility of such a neutral observation
language and thereby reframe induction, since our
engagements as researchers are seen to be always
mediated by our culturally derived interpretations,
may become marginalized by default. These al-
ternative ways of undertaking induction, initially
represented by cell 3 of Table 1, remain at best
under-explored or at worst delegitimized ab initio,
thereby possibly encouraging the very monologi-
cal processes that these criteriological commenta-
tors seem to challenge in their initial espousal of
a form of methodological pluralism. Meanwhile
cell 4 of Table 1 represents a philosophically in-
coherent position. Here the notion that actors’
inter-subjective processes should play no role in so-
cial science research cannot sit conformably with
the simultaneous rejection of a neutral observa-
tional language. This is because the latter epistemic
stance is usually justiﬁed by recognition of the role
those same inter-subjective processes play in re-
search processes themselves thereby justifying the
rejection of a neutral observational language.
The inadvertent, yet contradictory, philosoph-
ical and methodological parochialism articulated
in the recent criteriological commentaries noted
above has the potential for stimulating exclusion-
ary processes of criteriological commensuration.
Indeed it seems to be another example of the ‘ex-
tended controversy’ (Guba and Lincoln, 2005, p.
205) that persists where static standards, that unre-
ﬂexively express particular philosophical assump-
tions, gain indiscriminate epistemological jurisdic-
tion (see also Easterby-Smith, Golden-Biddle and
Locke, 2008; Grey, 2010; Johnson et al., 2006).
However, as Burrell andMorgan (1979) demon-
strated, there are always choices with regard to
these matters that need to be considered. If we ac-
cept their notion that any account is conditioned
by an underlying philosophical sub-text, then re-
ﬂexivity, which holds ‘research structures and log-
ics as themselves researchable and not immutable’
(Steier, 1991, p. 7), is crucial to our understand-
ing of our own and others’ methodological praxis.
Therefore, in the originally reﬂexive and permis-
sively contingent spirit of methodological plural-
ism (seeMcLennan, 1995), it would seem timely to
consider and extend our understandings of induc-
tion by examining how varying a priori philosophi-
cal commitments may lead to induction’s method-
ological differentiation. Here, for several reasons,
our primary focuswill beGT: ﬁrst, because ofGT’s
ubiquity as a qualitative methodology generally in
the social sciences (see Strauss and Corbin, 1997)
and because of its signiﬁcant proﬁle in manage-
ment research (see Locke, 2001;Welch et al., 2013);
second, because GT’s longstanding inﬂuence upon
the format of software programmes widely used in
qualitative data analysis may be acting as a Tro-
jan horse in the emergence of a ‘new orthodoxy’
for induction (Bryman and Bell, 2011, p. 595);
third, because its recent speciﬁcation by manage-
ment researchers’ criteriological commentary (see
Bluhm et al., 2011; Suddaby, 2006) raises ques-
tions as to why one should try to epistemologically
and criteriologically constrain GT despite its of-
ten being regarded as an ‘umbrella covering several
different variants’ (Charmaz, 2009, p. 128) deriv-
ing from a range of philosophical stances; fourth,
because there are alternative forms of induction
which could be considered, such as analytical in-
duction. However, despite a longer pedigree, ana-
lytical induction is rarely deployed in the manage-
ment ﬁeld and, when it is, this is often as a helpful
and commensurable elaboration that is combined
with GT to improve causal analysis (e.g. Johnson,
2004). Finally, given GT’s popularity as a form
of induction, its standardization to the conﬁnes
of neo-positivism may serve as a conduit to fur-
ther undermine the current philosophical diversity
evident in qualitative management research (see
Duberley, Johnson and Cassell, 2012; Grey, 2010)
by inﬂuencing the implicit and explicit criteria de-
ployed during research evaluation (see Amis and
Silk, 2008; Savall et al., 2008).
To pursue these aims we shall structure this
paper as follows. First we trace the empiricist
origins of induction through to its present-day
methodological justiﬁcation. Second we explore
how rival epistemological views (initially repre-
sented by cells 2 and 3 in Table 1) about the vi-
ability of a neutral observational language im-
pact upon the conduct of induction. Here we
give speciﬁc reference to neo-positivist prescrip-
tions for GT and the ‘second generation’s’ (see
Morse et al., 2009) challenge which has applied so-
cial constructionism to those inductive processes
via various epistemological stances. In doing so,
we identify the key parameters of the philosoph-
ical diversity articulated in choices around neu-
trality, description and theorization. We conclude
by offering a reﬂexive framework of such induc-
tive praxis as a heuristic device for interrogat-
ing the different philosophical choices at play in
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the variable constitution of inductive management
research.
Empiricism and induction
Induction’s philosophical pedigree precedes the
deployment of hypothetico-deductivism (e.g. Ba-
con, 1620; Comte, 1853; Hume, 1739, 1748; Locke,
1690; Mill, 1874). Nevertheless, it is the latter
which has become the mainstream methodology,
especially in US management research, under the
aegis of Popper’s (1959) falsiﬁcationism. Popper
rejected the possibility of the inductive veriﬁca-
tion of theories by revitalizing, and attempting
to resolve, Hume’s (1739) ‘problem of induction’.
The latter arose because of the intimate relation-
ship between induction and empiricism in his sec-
ular desire to ‘commit to the ﬂames . . . [the] . . .
sophistry and illusion’ (Hume, 1748, sec. vii, pt iii)
of received metaphysical speculation. Hume’s ad-
vocacy of Locke’s (1690) empiricism in this epis-
temological purge led him to reject all ideas that
could not be traced to corresponding sense impres-
sions. But the empirical problem for Hume was
that causation is in itself not directly observable
and thereby could not be validated by experience.
Rather the causal associations we anticipate lie in
our customs or ‘force of habit’ − ideas which have
developed from our past observation of repeated
resembling, chronologically ordered, spatially re-
lated, ‘constant conjunctions’. For Hume, it was
impossible to verify any proposed causal relation-
ship through logical inference from past experi-
ence to a suppositional future, regardless of the
number of accumulated empirical conﬁrmations,
without engaging in the anathema of metaphysi-
cal speculation through deploying ampliative as-
sumptions. This epistemological contradiction led
Hume to doubt the possibility of induction: a scep-
ticism that was down-played in the subsequent de-
velopment of positivism (Comte, 1853) and the de-
ployment of induction by logical positivists (e.g.
Ayer, 1971.
By the twentieth century certain philosophical
commitments were established which guided
the application of inductive analysis and were
maintained by logical positivists to defend En-
lightenment reason against the rise of Fascism
(see Callinicos, 1989). The ﬁrst is a commitment
to empiricism and the veriﬁability principle of
meaning where something is only meaningful if it
is empirically veriﬁable through sense experience
and observation (Ayer, 1971, p. 48). The second
commitment, traceable to Epicurean Hellenistic
philosophy (see Long and Sedley, 1987), is to a
neutral observational language where truth as cor-
respondence with reality is to be found in the ob-
server’s passive registration of Comte’s ‘positively
given’ (i.e. data) located in a directly accessible
mind-independent external reality (see Reichen-
bach, 1963; Wittgenstein, 1922): a subject–object
dualism. Third is a commitment tomethodological
monism: that only natural science methodology
can provide certain knowledge in the social sci-
ences (see Ross, 1991). However, at the heart of
logical positivism’s commitment to empiricism and
inductive-veriﬁcationism lay Hume’s epistemolog-
ical contradiction. Popper rescued positivism by
reconﬁguring the scientiﬁc enterprise as deductive-
falsiﬁcationism. He exploited the empirical asym-
metry between the proof and disproof through his
proposition of falsiﬁcationism aimed at producing
verisimilitude based upon the ability of a theory’s
postulates to survive predictive tests aimed at
objectively identifying non-correspondence with
an external reality (Popper, 1976, pp. 148−150).
Contemporary justiﬁcations for
induction
As Welch et al. (2013, pp. 252–253) found, an
inductive approach has often been justiﬁed apolo-
getically as a necessary precursor to deduction
because of the exploratory or novel nature of the
research undertaken. Rather than being presented
as deduction’s poor relation others have justi-
ﬁed induction as superior through assertions of
enhanced naturalism that makes ﬁndings more
plausible, accessible and relevant (Glaser and
Strauss, 1967; Locke, 2001; Van Maanen, 1979)
especially to non-researchers (Watson, 2011) as it
provides ‘a strong handle on what “real life” is like’
(Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 10). Related to
naturalism, another justiﬁcation centres upon the
view that deductive testing necessarily entails a pri-
ori operationalization of deterministic behavioural
variables in which their inter-subjective basis is
absent, or at best distorted (Denzin and Lincoln,
2000; Guba and Lincoln, 1994). By signifying the
importance of inter-subjectivity qualitative re-
searchers are concurrently drawing upon the long
established idea that there exists an ontological
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discontinuity (see Dilthey, 1976; Giddens, 1976;
Laing, 1967; Mead, 1934; Merleau-Ponty, 1962)
between the subject matters of the social and natu-
ral sciences. Since human behaviour, unlike that of
physical objects, is inherently meaningful to actors
it cannot be explained as the necessary outcome of
the action of discrete causal variables (see Dilthey,
1976, p. 89); methodological monism must be
rejected (see Ross, 1991). Moreover, we cannot
reduce lived experience to a number of separate
factors operating as distinct inﬂuences regardless
of the social context in which action arises (see
Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. ix). Therefore in order
to access inter-subjectivity, explanations must be
generated through verstehen (Outhwaite, 1975):
the inductive description and analysis of actors’
cultures in ‘natural’ (Denzin, 1971), ‘real’, settings
(Gephart, 2004, p. 457). This dismissal of method-
ological monism as arising from a categorical error
that conﬂates the social with the natural seems
to put philosophical distance between positivism
and the present-day deployment of induction.
Nevertheless, how induction is used in qualitative
management research sometimes retains key pos-
itivistic elements (see cell 2 of Table 1) – especially
the presupposition of a neutral observational lan-
guage and the consequent necessity to rigorously
demonstrate the plausible objectivity required by
the criteriological commentaries discussed earlier.
A priori theory and induction
Contemporary induction in management re-
search, usually seen as synonymous with GT, is
often presented as a ﬂexible process where research
questions, conceptualizations of phenomena, and
theory concurrently emerge and are constantly
reﬁned through interaction with an evolving anal-
ysis of the data being collected through various
forms of iterative ﬁeldwork (Glaser and Strauss,
1967; Suddaby, 2006). This immediately begs
questions regarding the role of a priori theory
during induction. It is of particular importance
for qualitative researchers who may be criticized
for lacking rigour in comparison to hypothetico-
deductive researchers who systematically design
research to refute theoretical predictions. Here
two different positions are initially evident: ﬁrst,
that such pre-understandings need to be used as
preliminary guides; second, that they must be kept
at bay by being ‘bracketed’ from the outset.
The ﬁrst position initially seems to be informed
by Heidegger’s (1927, p. 24) hermeneutics where
he points to how we are always caught in a com-
munally informed pre-understanding of being: a
hermeneutical circle with no access to an un-
interpreted given. For some, this epistemological
predicament means that that we must clarify the
theoretical pre-understandings we have to hand
from the start of research. This is illustrated by
Blumer (1954, p. 7) when he argued that, at the
outset, researchers should take from extant liter-
ature ‘sensitizing concepts’ which ‘merely suggest
directions in which to look’ and constitute ﬂex-
ible guides for uncovering empirical variation in
phenomena rather than imposing a priori observa-
tional benchmarks.
The second view of the relationship with prior
theory parallels Husserl’s (1965) phenomenology.
This aims to provide descriptions of actors’ con-
sciousness located in sedimentations of past expe-
rience of phenomena that are largely cultural and
lead us to conceive the world as a common albeit
experienced from different perspectives. To access
the appearance of things in the external world to
actors, Husserl argued that the researcher’s own
preconceptions of those phenomena (the natural
attitude) must be set aside through ‘bracketing’ (or
‘epoche’ − the act of suspending judgement about
the natural world to instead focus on analysis of
mental experience) so as to enable ‘reduction’: the
uncovering of the essential structure of phenom-
ena as subjectively experienced by others. So al-
though Husserl was a staunch critic of positivism
(see Husserl, 1965, p. 189) this presumed ability
to bracket suggests the promulgation of an epis-
temic privilege akin to neo-positivism’s presump-
tion of a neutral observational language: the re-
searcher’s ability to investigate the ‘essences’ of
the phenomena constituted in the ‘lifeworld’ free
from pre-conception and bias. In other words a
subject−subject dualism is assumed.
Meanwhile, recognition of Heidegger’s
hermeneutic circle could lead to two stances
within the ﬁrst position noted above. The ﬁrst
entails dismissal of any positivist commitment
to a neutral detached observer as a myth since
no interpretation free from presuppositions is
ever possible: a subject–subject duality that has
signiﬁcant implications for the accomplishment of
induction and the epistemic status of the outcomes
of research. The second follows Blumer (1954),
for example, where recognition of the hermeneutic
© 2015 The Authors British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
Inductive Praxis and Management Research 765
circle might be limited to indicating the practical
difficulties of starting any research without a
preceding conceptual interaction with extant
theory: a starting point that does not necessarily
undermine the possibility of a subject–subject
dualism during ﬁeldwork and data analysis.
As we shall discuss below, there is debate over
these alternative epistemological stances in the
most inﬂuential contemporary approach to induc-
tion within management research: GT.
Neo-positivism’s subject−subject
dualism in GT
Management researchers (e.g. Alvesson and
Skoldberg, 2000; Gephart, 2004) have identiﬁed
how GT was developed by Glaser and Strauss
(1967) as a response by symbolic interactionists
to the categorical error entrenched in method-
ological monism (see also Cherutz and Swanson,
1986) and to the threats posed by the method-
ological hegemony of structural functionalism.
From the outset GT articulated a commitment
to investigating how actors interpret reality and
also abstracting those empirical descriptions into
theoretical statements: ambitions that created
epistemological ambiguities. What initially con-
cerns us is the extent to which GT has necessarily
severed ties to (neo) positivist epistemology.
Originally Glaser and Strauss (1967, pp. 161–
183) saw the library as a source of qualitative data
for aiding the development of theory through elab-
orating categories and as an aid to constant com-
parison. What they are unclear about is the role of
extant literature at the outset of research (see also
Dey, 1999). For example they talk of generating
‘formal theory . . . directly from data . . . [but] . . .
it is more desirable, and usually necessary, to start
formal theory from a substantive one’ (Glaser and
Strauss, 1967, p. 79) already articulated in research.
This ambiguity seems to have evolved into an im-
portant difference in subsequent approaches. For
example Glaser (1978, p. 3; 1992, p. 31), as part of
a strategy formaintaining a dispassionate objectiv-
ity in ﬁeldwork, requires that no extant theory or
literature should be deployed until an initial the-
oretical framework had been developed through
‘sensitive’ immersion in order to generate theory
that ‘really exists in data’ (1992, p. 53). In contrast,
Strauss (1987; Strauss and Corbin, 1990, 1998)
seems to follow Blumer’s idea of overtly develop-
ing sensitizing concepts from the relevant litera-
ture as necessary provisional points of departure
but nonetheless requiringmaintenance of objectiv-
ity in relation to data and participants to produce
‘provisionally veriﬁed’ theory (Straus and Corbin,
1990, p. 25). Regardless of these differences, Glaser
and Strauss (and Corbin), with their continuing
emphasis upon discovery and emergence, have re-
mained committed to a neutral observational lan-
guage (see Charmaz, 2000, p. 513; Clarke, 2003)
during data collection and analysis so as to ob-
jectively develop theories embedded in the mean-
ingful everyday inter-subjective realities of actors
(see Glaser, 1992, p. 16; Strauss and Corbin, 1998,
p. 99). According to Frendt and Sachs (2008, p.
447), this commitment to a subject−subject dual-
ism requires demonstration of a separation of the
researcher from his/her description and analysis of
other actors’ inter-subjective cultural experiences:
the hypostatization of a passive observer which en-
ables them to avoid recursively applying the no-
tion of interpretation to themselves. The result is
an epistemological privileging of any inductive ac-
count by management researchers (see Knights,
1992; Van Maanen, 1995) as ‘part of another
foundationalist enterprise’ (Thomas and James,
2006, p. 780): a dogged neo-positivist demonstra-
tion of the qualitative researcher’s ‘more rigorous
than thou’methodological attributes (Thomas and
James, 2006, p. 788).
For instance, Lincoln and Guba (1985) empha-
sized the requirement for researchers to provide
traceable, self-critical and sometimes confessional
audit trails to allow the reader to judge the ob-
jectivity and rigour of their research. Especially
important here is an account of the researcher’s
ﬁeld role that reﬂexively analyses the steps taken
to maintain naturalism whilst navigating a course
that avoids both cultural co-option and ethnocen-
tricity by demonstrating a precarious social, emo-
tional and intellectual balance between insider and
outsider (e.g. Cicourel, 1982; Hammersley, 1992;
Pollner and Emerson, 1983). Audit trails also pro-
vide details of how inductive analysis of data was
accomplished to produce emergent descriptions
and theory. So, in order to corroborate the objec-
tivity of ﬁndings and demonstrate theoretical sen-
sitivity, researchers are strongly advised to show
how an unimpaired interplay of data with theory
and description was achieved. This includes an ac-
count of how concepts and categories were syn-
thesized, memo-ed, coded, cross-referenced with
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inter-rater checks to various data sources, applied
and theorized along with how alternative analyti-
cal outcomes have been considered and why they
were discarded (see Adler and Adler, 1994; Locke,
1996; Morse, 1994). It is precisely the need to
demonstrate how these processes have been un-
dertaken in order to persuasively display a ‘hard
won objectivity’ (see Seale, 1999, p. 161) that has
been one of the key foci of recent criteriological
speciﬁcations by various commentaries in presti-
gious management journals (see Bansal and Cor-
ley, 2011; Bluhm et al., 2011; Gephart, 2004; Pratt,
2009; Suddaby, 2006; Tracy, 2010, 2012).
Description and theorization of
inter-subjectivity
Inductive analysis usually begins with ‘thick’
descriptions (Geertz, 1973, p. 24) of shared
interpretations (Gephart, 2004; Glaser, 1992).
Phenomenologists would usually consider such
description of actors’ lifeworlds sufficient and
analytical movement beyond the world-as-
experienced in order to theoretically explain it
to be an epistemological violation (see Thomas
and James, 2006, pp. 771–773). In contrast, others
classify this phenomenological stricture as result-
ing in analytical interruptus (Loftland, 1970): a
failure to develop theory that explains why any
observed variation in observed cultural categories
happens (see Denzin, 1978; Schatzman, 1991)
and to show how those subjective experiences
may be abstracted into theoretical statements
about causal relations between actors (Suddaby,
2006, p. 635). Here neo-positivist GT purportedly
provides procedural guidelines for accomplishing
both a neutral description of actors’ interpretive
processes and their subsequent theorization.
It is emphasized that data analysis and col-
lection should simultaneous and recursively in-
form each other to establish descriptive categories
which, initially, are in constant ﬂux as new data
are collected and analysed (see Miles and Hu-
berman, 1994; Morse, 1994). Through memo-ing
and open-coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p.
181) related observations are consolidated to for-
mulate provisional conceptual properties (Glaser
and Strauss, 1967, pp. 35–36). Eventually concep-
tual categories are created, which combine con-
ceptual properties and refer to speciﬁc variations
in phenomena, having been adjusted and re-coded
as new data are collected and compared to em-
brace all observations and achieve theoretical sat-
uration (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p. 61). Here a
move from description to theoretical development
is enabled through analysing relationships between
the saturated, internally homogeneous, categories
‘which best explain the data . . . assembled’ (see
Becker, 1970, p. 196). This abstraction of patterns
of actors’ common subjective experiences into the-
oretical statements is often seen as problematic. As
we indicate above, for some it entails a move be-
yond the knowing actor’s experience in order to ex-
plain it: a philosophical impropriety as it relegates
the actor’s ‘original voice’ (Thomas and James,
2006, p. 790). For others it entails a process that
often lacks systematic means of identifying the re-
lationships between categories so as to rigorously
ground theoretical emergence (Wasserman, Clair
and Wilson, 2009).
There have been attempts at systematizing in-
ductive causal inference by deployingMill’s (1874)
inductive methods for causal analysis (e.g. Bloor,
1976, 1978; Johnson, 2004; Miller and Fredericks,
1999) or by adding deductive testing of emergent
theory (e.g. Hammersley, 1989; Robinson, 1951).
In contrast, Strauss and Corbin (1990, p. 96) en-
courage ‘axial coding’ which puts ‘data back in
new ways . . . by making connections between cat-
egories’. Thismove fromdescription to ‘higher lev-
els of abstraction’ (Strauss, 1987, p. 55) through
the use of conditions and consequences matri-
ces to trace ‘paths of connectivity’ (Strauss and
Corbin, 1998, p. 129, 199) may be extended to
trace linkages in the data to micro and macro
conditions (Corbin and Strauss, 1996) and, some-
times aided by fractal concept analysis, to enable
macro-level conceptualization grounded in micro-
level data (Wasserman, Clair and Wilson, 2009).
For Glaser (1998) the use of such analytical proce-
dures is overly formulaic and forces theory rather
than allowing theory to emerge whilst controlling
the impact of any preconceptions. Nonetheless, re-
gardless of the procedures used, the aim would still
be the ‘discovery’ of causally homogeneous cate-
gories with no exceptions to the proposed induc-
tively generated theoretical inferences.
However, some remain unconvinced: as Thomas
and James (2006, p. 777) observe, where are the ‘in-
ference tickets coming from in the supposed pro-
cess of induction . . . ?’ They describe this abstract
shift to putative theorization as a ‘methodologi-
cal alchemy’ which is philosophically undesirable
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for qualitative researchers and fails to adequately
investigate and demonstrate the operation of in-
ferred causal relations.
Whilst some inductive researchers have at-
tempted to resolve this inference issue within the
samples accessed in their ﬁeldwork, Thomas and
James (2006) also point to the problem of making
ampliative inferences within an empiricist frame
of reference, which was ﬁrst articulated by Hume
and raises the issue of inductive generalization. Of-
ten the perceived outcome of ﬁeldwork is theory
grounded in empirical data from a relatively small
number of cases which undermine representative-
ness and generalization. This has created pressure
to increase the size of samples in qualitative re-
search (Cornelissen, 2009). For Eisenhardt (1989),
whilst there is a possibility that theory generated
inductively is likely to be novel and empirically
valid it lacks the sweep of ‘grand theory’ and re-
mains at a modest, idiosyncratic level applicable
only to the social context(s) in which it was de-
veloped and therefore requires deductive testing in
deﬁned populations to enable extrapolation (see
also Seale, 1999, p. 108). Nevertheless, Eisenhardt
(1989) also argues that generalizability can be en-
hanced by comparing the emergent theory to ex-
isting literature (p. 545) which for Morse (1994)
is part of a process of recontextualization where
theory can be abstracted to new settings. In con-
trast, Mitchell (1983; see also Stake, 2000) argues
that inductive inference can only be logical and de-
rives its generalizability from the demonstrated all-
inclusive power of the inductively generated and
tested theory (1983, p. 190). Here the rigour and
credibility of the procedures used on an initial
site to comprehensively embrace any negative case
through constant comparison until saturation oc-
curs legitimizes extrapolation to other sites. But
this still begs Hume’s question regarding how we
might ever know for certain that such comprehen-
sion and saturation is achieved and that the the-
ory is applicable to new and un-researched con-
texts without making ampliative assumptions that
negate neo-positivist’s empiricist commitments. As
Seale (1999, p. 112) cautions, ‘unwarranted as-
sumptions are made about the characteristics of
the population of cases not yet studied’. In sharp
contrast to these concerns, Denzin (1983) argues
that generalization is in any case impossible due to
the indexical or context-bound nature of human
behaviour and what Vince (2006, p. 351) calls the
consequent particularity of knowledge in context.
Social constructionism and the
subject−subject duality in GT
Charmaz is a key representative of what has
been dubbed the second generation of grounded
theorists (see Morse et al., 2009). She sees any in-
ductive product as the inevitable outcome of social
construction, rather than discovery or emergence,
which must undermine the (self) presentation of
researcher as ‘distant expert’ (Charmaz, 2000,
p. 513) because ‘data do not provide a window
on reality’ (2000, p. 524; also 2009, p. 130). Such
rejection of a neutral observational language
implies that any notion of researchers being able
to suppress their own subjectivity in order to
become a neutral conduit for others’ cultural
experience is both a quixotic rhetorical device
and a contradiction in interpretive work. How far
Charmaz develops the implications of this alter-
native epistemology for inductive praxis is rather
opaque. Searching for middle ground ‘between
postmodernism and positivism’ (2000, p. 510) she
clearly rejects what she calls ‘objectivist’ GT due
to its scientistic pretensions and complex proce-
dures (2000, p. 525). Social interaction between
researcher and researched . . . ‘produces data
and therefore the meanings that the researcher
observes and deﬁnes’. Thus any account of actors’
‘discovered’ realities is ‘co-produced’ (Charmaz,
1995, p. 35; 2006, p. 140) and countering sources
of bias to display objectivity becomes criterio-
logically irrelevant. Rather what is required is
a reﬂexive account of this co-authorship that
shows how voices of the researched are present
and meaningful. What is unclear here is what the
epistemological status of such accounts may be.
On the one hand, are they grounded and emergent
in a representational sense where the researcher
is assumed to be able to step outside his/her own
cultural patterning of beliefs to neutrally describe
this socially constructed inter-subjectivity pro-
duced through researcher-researched interaction?
This raises the issue as to whether Charmaz in-
advertently insulates this process from the action
of the researcher’s own interpretations to preserve
correspondence by default and epistemologically
contradict a social constructionist stance. On the
other hand, if any account cannot correspond with
inter-subjectivity, since the subjective processes
of social construction should presumably also
apply to producing the account itself, how can
the account aspire to present anything more than
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mere speculation – no matter how reﬂexive the
co-production process may appear to be? Alterna-
tively, if she is promulgating an epistemological al-
ternative to correspondence demonstrated by hard
won objectivity – what is it? Charmaz may leave
herself open to the accusation of epistemological
vacillation between the claim that ﬁndings emerge
from data about co-production and the claim that
they are the result of an analysis that was inevitably
the researcher’s own interpretation. This potential
dilemma seems to be avoided by those who have
also openly rejected a neutral observational lan-
guage but then have more overtly considered how
to develop coherent epistemological alternatives to
positivism that simultaneously eschew relativism.
For example, critical theory (CT) has long
rejected positivist epistemology (e.g. Horkheimer,
1937; Horkheimer and Adorno, 1947). In a
Kantian (see Kant, 1781) fashion all human
cognition is construed as deriving from a priori
inter-subjective processes which socially construct
versions of an external reality that simultaneously
exists independently of those sense-making pro-
cesses (see Habermas, 1974a, 1974b). So whilst we
may never know reality-as-it-is, that reality contin-
gently imposes pragmatic limits (Habermas, 1972,
p. 33) upon human activities: therefore anything
does not go. For Habermas (1984, 1987), the epis-
temological question becomes one of how to es-
tablish these realities-for-us legitimately and avoid
relativism. Here he develops consensus as an epis-
temic standard via his notion of the ideal-speech
situation wherein discursively produced demo-
cratic agreement between participants derives
from dialogue, argument and analysis without
the resort to coercion, distortion or duplicity. By
implication any discourse evolving outside these
conditions must be forced and distorted, thereby
raising the issue of ideological hegemony by the
powerful. This epistemology has been highly in-
ﬂuential upon a group of writers who have tried to
translate it into guidelines for inductive research.
For example, Habermasian epistemology was
inﬂuential upon Guba and Lincoln’s later work
(1989, 1994) where they developed authenticity as
social constructionist criteriological commitment.
Here inductive research, such as GT, becomes
more of a processual scheme that emphasizes
researchers’ and participants’ reﬂexive and dia-
logical examination of their own inter-subjective
understandings in the social context of the
hegemonic discourses at play. So, not only must
researchers reﬂexively interrogate their own a
priori stances (Kincheloe and McLaren, 1998),
they also must attempt to sensitize themselves
and participants to how hegemonic regimes of
truth impact upon their subjectivities in the de-
velopment of alternative understandings of reality
(Marcus and Fisher, 1986; Putnam et al., 1993).
For example, through inductively conducting ‘crit-
ical’ ethnographies (Forester, 2002; Morrow and
Brown, 1994; Thomas, 1993), and achieving ‘crit-
ical interpretations’ (Denzin, 1998, p. 332) which
go beyond a description of actors’ subjectivities to
develop theoretical understandings regarding the
manner in which those subjectivities become con-
stituted, the prime aim of the research is to liberate
those it studies so that they understand the world
in new ways and use this knowledge to change it
(Dryzek, 1995; Jermier, 1998; Schwandt, 1996).
In order to approximate Habermas’s ideal-speech
situation highly participative research designs are
deployed (e.g. Broadbent and Laughlin, 1997) that
aim to achieve dialogue (Schwandt, 1996, pp. 66–
67) where the credibility of the socially constructed
realities to those who have democratically partic-
ipated in their development is crucial (Kincheloe
and McLaren, 1998). In addition to consensus
as a key epistemic standard for these inductively
developed self-understandings and alternative
accounts of phenomena, there is a simultaneous
requirement that they should be used to intervene
and thereby change a status quo which previously
was construed as normal, authoritative and there-
fore immutable (see Alvesson, 1996; Gaventa and
Cornwall, 2006; Jermier, 1998; Park, 2006). The
result is sometimes a form of praxis aimed at trans-
forming perceived inequalities where, based upon
dialectical inductive theory building (Lather, 1991)
and a dialogical relationship with researchers
(Lynch, 1999, p. 57), participants become able to
both understand and change their situation (see
Brook and Darlington, 2013). Because of the con-
textually speciﬁc and socially constructed nature
of consensus, issues of generalizability are largely
irrelevant; instead there may be an emphasis
upon ‘accommodation’ (Kincheloe and McLaren,
1998) where researchers use their knowledge of
a range of comparable contexts to assess the
implications of similarities and differences for
praxis.
A commensurable philosophical position to CT,
but which often downplays consensus as an epis-
temic standard, is articulated by critical realism
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(CR) where ontological realism and epistemologi-
cal subjectivism are also combined (Bhaskar, 1978,
p. 249). Here, Bhaskar does this by differentiating
between the intransitive ontological dimension of
scientiﬁc inquiry (e.g. social reality), that exists in-
dependently of human knowledge, and the tran-
sitive socially constructed dimension (epistemol-
ogy) that allows us to make sense of our worlds
(see also Bhaskar, 1989). Nevertheless, unlike nat-
ural or physical reality, social reality is transi-
tively produced and reproduced through our inter-
subjectively derived agency but is intransitive in the
sense that it exists ‘at least in part independently
of any knowledge claims’ (Lawson, 1998, pp. 222–
223) about it. Therefore, as in CT, critical realists
have argued that we are always entrapped within
an a priori culturally derived subjectivity in our so-
cial construction of our understandings of social
reality. However, the latter, albeit it always medi-
ated by fallible human cognition, is not determined
by the former (see Fleetwood, 2004, p. 33; Sayer,
1992, p. 83; 2004, p. 8). Therefore critical realists
reject both a correspondence theory of truth and
the possibility of a neutral observational language
– but in doing so they also reject what is called
‘judgemental relativism’ where there are no ratio-
nal grounds for epistemologically judging between
accounts (see Bhaskar, 1986, p. 72).
A key aim for CR is to retroductively excavate
what Bhaskar (1986) claims are the structured lay-
ers of social reality so as to, in an inevitably fallible
manner, identify generative or causal powerswhich
underlie conceptually mediated (i.e. transitive) ob-
servable appearances in order to explain those em-
pirically patterned phenomena. In other words
during theorization CR seeks to link phenomena
such as the observable inter-subjectivity of agents
to the causal context of real but non-empirical
structures whichmay produce those ‘actual’ events
expressed in conceptually mediated empirical pat-
terns (Bhaskar, 1989, p. 16). Here social struc-
tures pre-exist, enable and constrain agency whilst
dialectically emerging from and changing that
agency (see Archer, 2003, pp. 5−6).
Although some critical realists have rejected GT
as amethodology (see Danermark et al., 2002) this
is usually because of its perceived neo-positivist
origins. For others, as ‘hermeneutics is essential’
(Archer et al., 1998, p. xv), a constructionist ver-
sion of GT that enables mediated access to agents’
inter-subjectivities but then moves to a situational
analysis ‘beyond the knowing subject’ (see Clarke,
2009, p. 200; 2003) to examine generative mecha-
nisms is deemed necessary and viable. Although
her idiom is slightly different, such situational
analysis of ‘unstated or unrecognised inﬂuences’ is
also something which Charmaz (2009, p. 130) sees
as necessary in her approach to GT.
However, this poses epistemological problems in
that, givenCR’s subjectivist epistemology, how can
we establish whether the causal powers retroduc-
tively excavated are more than a researcher’s the-
orization and are real ‘non-empirical’ structures
that condition, and are conditioned by, actors’
inter-subjectively derived activities (see Halfpenny,
1994, p. 65). Moreover, as Al-Amoudi and Will-
mott (2011, p. 29) argue, epistemological subjec-
tivism also applies to inductive analysis of those
actors’ inter-subjectivities. Indeed critical realists
may contradict their subjectivist epistemology by
inadvertently privileging their analyses: a potential
problem we have raised in relation to Charmaz’s
social constructionist GT. To avoid the pitfall of
positivist privileging, and in order to eschew the
perceived dangers of judgemental relativism, Sayer
(1992) proposes an alternative epistemic standard
for CR which he calls practical adequacy (pp. 69–
70) which simultaneously appears to be commen-
surable with CT’s emphasis upon consensus as a
basis for transformative praxis. Here, despite our
inability to escape inter-subjective processes, Sayer
(1992) argues that practical adequacy allows us
to rationally judge between our social construc-
tions by assessing their ability to ‘generate expecta-
tions about the world . . . that are actually realized’
(p. 70).
Sayer’s proposal of a critical realist epistemic
standard commensurable with a subject−subject
duality seems related to James’s and Dewey’s
rendition of Pragmatist philosophy which also
attempted to navigate an epistemological course
between what they saw as the Scylla and Charyb-
dis of positivism and relativism (Margolis, 1986).
Here there is some potential for confusion be-
cause Strauss (but not Glaser) is associated with
Pragmatist philosophy (see Locke, 2001; Suddaby,
2006). However, this is based upon Peirce’s view
of Pragmatism (see Strauss and Corbin, 1994).
Peirce (1931−58) argued that inductive and
abductive cooperative scientiﬁc inquiry, despite
being fallible, would eventually converge upon
a ﬁnal agreement that that would correspond
with reality (Vol. 8, chs 13 and 41). For Rescher
(1978, p. 52) this accretional view of scientiﬁc
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progress is proto Popperian in its epistemological
Darwinism. Although Peirce was cautious about
the possibility of objectivity, its epistemic rejection
is manifest in James’s and Dewey’s Pragmatism.
For example, James (1909) argued that ‘once we
give up the doctrine of objective certitude, we do
not thereby give the quest or hope of truth itself ’
(p. 17) because ‘experience . . . has ways of boiling
over, and making us correct our present formulas’
(James, 1897, p. 106; see also Dewey, 1929a, p. 19).
In doing so they articulated an epistemic standard
similar to practical adequacy and commensurable
with CT’s consensus standard as it focuses upon
the extent to which inductively generated theory,
grounded in dialogue and consensus, enables
‘workable’ interventions which can be assessed
with reference to the extent to which they ‘settle
problematic situations’ (Dewey, 1929b, p. iii).
Through such praxis, it is thought contact with
reality is enabled which allows evaluation and
thus avoids judgemental relativism because it is
‘the circumpressure of reality itself, which gets us
sick of concrete errors’ (James, 1909, p. 72; see
also Gustavsen, 2006; Margolis, 1986).
Therefore Pragmatism has important implica-
tions for evaluating GT in terms of its workabil-
ity or practical adequacy. This is something which
Charmaz (2006) implies when she points to how
grounded theories are always potentially transfor-
mative since they allow people to ‘see the world
from a different vantage point and create new
meanings’ whichmay be acted upon (p. 128). How-
ever, Pragmatism also has implications for how
qualitative researchers epistemically evaluate their
inductively built hermeneutical understandings of
others’ inter-subjectivity that goes beyond consen-
sus. Here, for example, Davidson (1984, p. 200) has
argued that such understandings must articulate
what any cultural outsider must access and learn
in order for them to be able to communicate and
behave with pragmatic success and consistency in
the cultural settings they are investigating.
Thus it would seem that the implications for
the deployment of constructionist GT by CT and
CR are similar and imply a signiﬁcant degree of
epistemological complementarity. Both emphasize
the important role played by GT in describing ac-
tors’ inter-subjectivity and in retroductive moves
beyond the knowing subject to examine genera-
tive mechanisms. The main variability here can be
the emphasis put upon actors’ democratic and di-
alogical participation in the formulation of these
descriptions and theorizations− something which
has a relationship to the extent to which consen-
sus is valued as a constructionist epistemic stan-
dard. Simultaneously both CR and CT emphasize
the need for intervention and change based upon
the emergent, often dialogically grounded, theory.
Such interventions enable the further evaluation of
theory in terms of its practical adequacy or work-
ability. The key implication here is that GT then
becomes part of a highly participative formof criti-
cal action research (see Cassell and Johnson, 2006)
in the sense that it aids analysis and diagnosis and
then becomes the basis of interventions whose ef-
fects may be evaluated before triggering a further
round of participatory analysis, diagnosis, inter-
vention and so on, possibly in new social contexts
to explore the extent of accommodation.
Conclusions
In this paper we have attempted to contribute
towards a reﬂexive understanding of the variable
constitution of GT as a key example of con-
temporary inductive praxis. In this analysis we
have mapped how varying philosophical commit-
ments impact upon the deployment of induction
in management research around the issues of
neutral engagement, description, causal analysis
and theorization of inter-subjectivity. Figure 1
summarizes the philosophical choices we have
discussed and which inevitably face inductive
researchers but may remain unnoticed. Figure 1
begins with choices, driven by varying ontolog-
ical and epistemological commitments, between
verstehen and erklaren and their rival inductive
or deductive methodologies. Once verstehen and
induction are chosen, researchers are implicitly
faced by the choice between a subject−subject
dualism and a subject−subject duality. We argue
that neo-positivist approaches toGT are allied to a
subject−subject dualism but with that selection re-
searchers simultaneously have to deal with the rele-
vance and impact of pre-existing theory upon their
research: a choice that we have illustrated by the
differences between bracketing and the use of sen-
sitizing concepts. Simultaneously neo-positivists
have to make choices around the aims of their re-
search with regard to cultural description or then
using those descriptions as a basis for subsequent
theorization that moves beyond the actors’ voices
whilst methodologically justifying the ‘inference
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43
Refer 
Recognition of an ontological 
discontinuity between subject 
matters of natural and social 
sciences?
Verstehen and inductive methodologies 
such as grounded theory
Erklaren and hypothetico-deductive 
methodology 
yes no
Neutral observational language available 
− -expressed as a subject−subject 
dualism to enable correspondence, e.g. 
isomorphism with actors’ inter-
subjectivity? 
Bracketing of a priori theory and 
pre-understandings? 
yes 
no 
Alternative social constructionist 
epistemologies based upon a 
presumption of a subject−subject 
duality
Emphasis: practical 
adequacy as a theory of 
truth
Emphasis: consensus as 
a theory of truth 
e.g. Critical theory: 
reflexive, dialogical, 
democratic, 
inductive processes 
to describe and 
theorize inter-
subjectivity and 
democratically 
change participants’ 
self-understandings 
as a basis for 
transformative 
change through 
participative action 
research 
e.g. Critical realism 
and Pragmatism: 
emphasis upon 
hermeneutics and 
inductively 
formulated 
descriptions of inter-
subjectivity with 
retroductive 
analysis of 
generative 
mechanisms: 
application of theory 
through participative 
action research to 
judge practical 
adequacy of theory 
sometimes initially 
grounded in 
dialogue and 
consensus with 
participants 
yesNo
Formulation of 
sensitizing 
concepts to 
clarify pre-
understanding, 
e.g. Blumer, 
Strauss, with an 
emphasis upon 
objectivity during 
fieldwork 
demonstrated via 
audit trail 
No extant theory 
deployed at start 
of fieldwork, e.g . 
Glaserian 
approach with an 
emphasis upon 
objectivity during 
fieldwork and the 
demonstration of 
sensitive and 
objective 
immersion in the 
data 
(1) Cultural description only or (2) Description 
combined with causal theoretical abstraction? 
21
Description and theorization: e.g. Straussian 
coding vs Glaserian theoretical sensitvity – 
concern with extrapolation of theory to other 
social contexts 
Analytical interruptus?  Ethnographic 
descriptions of actors’ inter-subjectivity limited to 
social contexts of research sites
Figure 1. Variations in grounded theory and philosophical choices: a reflexive framework
tickets’ that are used in this process. As can be seen
in Figure 1, the choice of whether or not to bracket
does not dictate the aims of the research, i.e. the ex-
tent of theoretical abstraction produced, but it will
inﬂuence the research process undertaken and the
perceived role of a priori theory in data collection.
In contrast, the earlier choice of a subject−
subject duality leads to various social construc-
tionist approaches where issues of epistemological
legitimization, whilst avoiding claims to neu-
trality and eschewing judgemental relativism,
loom large. Here we have considered how re-
lated approaches, such as CT and CR, with
their varying emphases upon consensus and
practical adequacy as epistemological stan-
dards, have reformulated the deployment of
GT by in effect changing what ‘grounded’
means.
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Therefore, as illustrated with speciﬁc reference
to GT, induction may vary considerably under
the impact of variable philosophical assumptions.
We have attempted to illustrate key aspects of this
diversity by showing the apparent variance in how
qualitative researchers have attempted to ‘ground’
their descriptions and explanations of actors’
meaningful behaviour deriving from observation
of social phenomena in their ‘natural’ context.
Hence, as we have argued, there are multiple
potentially legitimate approaches to induction
generally, and GT in particular, depending on the
philosophical commitments being deployed and
the coherence between those philosophical com-
mitments and the approach taken. This potential
plurality starkly contrasts with the singularity
deemed appropriate by much commentary in
prestigious management journals.
Therefore we suggest that it would seem highly
arbitrary and excessively limiting to attempt to
discipline qualitative researchers to adopt speciﬁc
procedures which articulate only neo-positivist
knowledge constituting assumptions. Within neo-
positivism’s epistemology, as Thomas and James
wryly observe (2006, p. 779) ‘neutral analytical
procedures replace neutral controls and treatments
of the experiment . . . in the hope . . . [of] . . . an
uncontaminated correspondence’. It is precisely
these epistemic aims that have been one of the key
foci of jurisdictional speciﬁcation by commentary
in prestigious management journals ostensibly in
support of methodological pluralism (see Bansal
and Corley, 2011; Bluhm et al., 2011; Gephart,
2004; Pratt, 2009; Suddaby, 2006; Tracy, 2010,
2012). Obviously such commentary can be helpful
within a neo-positivist perspective. Indeed much
discourse seems to focus upon strategies for cop-
ing with the epistemic contradictions and prob-
lems encountered by their empiricist forerunners
especially around causal analysis and empirical ex-
trapolationwhilst trying to avoid the contradiction
of metaphysical speculation. But surely this criteri-
ological speciﬁcation is limited to those underlying
knowledge constituting assumptions.Moreover, as
we have indicated, even within a subject−object
dualism other philosophical disputes lead to vary-
ing methodological commitments around the-
orization and description. For others such is-
sues are eschewed through epistemological shifts
away from neo-positivism which result in con-
siderable methodological reorientation that is
legitimate within those alternative social con-
structionist knowledge constituting philosophical
assumptions.
In the spirit of a permissive pluralism, Figure 1
attempts to summarize those choices invariably
encountered in conducting inductive research
and their relationship to varying philosophical
sub-texts. Our key point is that such sub-texts
need to be reﬂexively interrogated and articulated
in both the design and reporting of research
so that different choices are contextualized and
justiﬁed with reference to ever-present knowledge
constituting assumptions rather than being taken
by default. Moreover, as a heuristic and reﬂexive
device Figure 1 has criteriological consequences
that require recognition so as to maintain the
legitimacy of the philosophical diversity evident in
qualitative management research. It implies a need
to move beyond criteriological ‘diversiﬁcation’
approaches which aim to develop evaluation cri-
teria speciﬁc to particular methodologies like GT
(see Sparkes, 2001) to a recognition that varying
knowledge constituting assumptions can be put
into practice in very different ways by what might
ostensibly seem to be the same methodology.
The implication of this for management research
is that the deployment of different evaluation
criteria needs to be overtly contingent upon such
philosophical variance (see Johnson et al., 2006).
Clearly this requires that researchers, commenta-
tors and evaluators give more consideration to the
philosophical assumptions they are employing in
their judgements of research ‘quality’ as the latter
is a concept with many meanings. For researchers,
this brings reﬂexivity to the forefront of inductive
research. Such reﬂexivity can take many forms
(see Cunliffe, 2003; Johnson and Duberley, 2003;
Lynch, 2000). It is clear, however, that at a mini-
mum researchers should engage with underlying
philosophical assumptions from the very start of
framing a research project, not only when consid-
ering data analysis. Without careful consideration
of these issues the ﬁeld risks the unintended
imposition of epistemological conformity and cri-
teriological commensuration. We argue that this
should be countered by a permissive recognition
of philosophical differences and the consequent
need to vary how research is evaluated in the
light of reﬂexive interrogation and articulation of
our, too often unnoticed, knowledge constituting
assumptions.
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